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“Culture is as culture does”1 
Abstract  
The analysis reported here focused on the dynamic interaction between a 
preferred strategic management model of the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) on the one hand, and the SANDF’s acquired strategic culture on the other. 
From a theoretical perspective, the analysis draws attention to the fact that the 
properties of institutional culture inform the extent to which an organisation (such as 
the SANDF) suffers the deleterious consequences of an inappropriate management 
model. The article therefore argues that the military’s lack of consensus on an 
appropriate political culture, the lack of a suitable social culture and the lack of an 
effective military culture have resulted in maintaining the continued viability of two 
discrete, concurrent strategic cultural paradigms in the SANDF: that of the defunct 
SADF2 (initially dominant), and that of the obsolete MK3 (currently governing). The 
uneasy co-existence of these two paradigms, each with its own worldview and value 
system, has confounded the efforts of the SANDF to form an appropriate intended 
strategy and to realise military effectiveness in its execution. A dichotomous 
strategic culture has, in effect, reinforced the weaknesses of the SANDF’s strategic 
management model, impeded organisational responsiveness, maximised 
organisational entropy, and encouraged the defence force’s systemic decline – the 
latter, a fact that the Defence Review 2014 specifically acknowledges in the 
discussion of the review’s first milestone.4 This part mainly employs deductive 
reasoning and draws its conclusions from a focused literary review. 
Introduction 
Upon examining the defence budget 
vote speech of 23 May 2013, one comes under 
the impression that the SANDF is on the 
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threshold of a second transformation – this time, aiming at military effectiveness, 
rather than civil oversight or racial representativeness.5 Nevertheless, by the end of 
2014 government still had to match its assurances of the previous year with tangible 
action. Given the mandatory character of defence policy, one may consequently 
presume that defence leadership of the past decade had not been convinced of the 
appropriateness of South African defence policy from the beginning, and had never 
meant to achieve its intended outcomes anyway.6 Such an assumption would be 
premature, though. In continuation of the reasoning reflected in Part 1, the study 
now argues that the enduring strategic lethargy of the SANDF can instead be 
explained by the dynamic interaction between defence’s preferred strategic 
management model on the one hand, and its acquired strategic culture(s) on the 
other. Whereas Part 1 reported on the development of a strategic management 
archetype for the military (rendered graphically in Figure 1), the second part argues 
that the strategic culture of an organisation will ultimately determine the extent to 
which the institution suffers the harmful consequences of adopting an inappropriate 
management model. Operating from within the organisation, the influence of the 
defence force’s strategic culture would be visible from the formulation of its policy 
(the Defence Reviews of 1998 and 2014, for example), through to its deliberate 
implementation, and onwards to the forming of defence’s realised strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Forming realised strategy 
Part 2 of the article therefore delves deeper into the relationship between the 
strategic management model and strategic culture, starting with the latter idea.  
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Strategic culture as an intervening variable 
Most of the available evidence suggests that the concept of a strategic 
culture is real and powerful. What is debatable, though, is the magnitude of the 
influence of culture on strategic behaviour.7 Some anthropologists and sociologists, 
for example, consider the relationship between culture and strategy as a combination 
of discursive (what is said) and non-discursive (what remains unsaid) expressions; 
consequently, that the relationship between culture and strategy is so complex that it 
is impossible to measure.8 On the other hand, analysts of a constructivist bent 
consider culture as the major justification for all strategic performance, and would 
be comfortable with a statement such as “[p]olities as more or less distinctive 
strategic cultures tend to commit characteristic errors; indeed, their errors may be 
caused by some of their virtues”.9 A third approach could be adopted by those who 
merely consider culture as a supplementary explanation for strategic behaviour, 
believing that its subjective influence on decision-making is subordinate to the 
objective constraints of international systemic pressures – in other words, that 
strategic culture is outranked by the functional imperative.10 Whatever one’s 
inclinations are, though, it would be difficult to deny that the response of a particular 
institution to functional and societal imperatives is at least partly dependent on the 
values and perceptions (and therefore the societal paradigms) of its decision-makers. 
This basic fact is implied in Schein’s definition of organisational culture:  
Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) 
invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns 
to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid, 
and therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct 
way to perceive, think, or feel in relation to these problems.11  
With specific reference to strategic culture, Johnston is of the opinion that it 
consists of an integrated system of symbols (such as argumentation structures, 
languages, analogies and metaphors), which act to establish strategic preferences for 
the organisation. It exerts influence by generating paradigms on the role and efficacy 
of military force in interstate political affairs, and by cloaking the resultant 
constructs with such an aura of truth that the organisation’s strategic preferences 
seem uniquely sensible and effectual to those immersed within the particular 
culture.12 Strategic culture is therefore a primary component of the organisational 
imperative, where it serves as an intervening variable between the external 
environment (the functional and societal imperatives) and the organisation’s 
expression of strategic behaviour. Stated in constructivist terms, strategists 
subconsciously employ their cultures to assist with their interpretation of the 
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objective constraints from their external environment, i.e. creating order from chaos, 
and comprehension from confusion.13 Culture therefore serves both as a perception 
filter for the realities of the strategic and domestic contexts on the cognitive input 
side of the organisational imperative, and as a focusing lens on the behavioural 
output side. This means that any two organisations, distinct in terms of strategic 
culture, will come to different conclusions when faced with the same set of 
functional and societal imperatives. To arrive at the reasons why this should be so, 
one has to turn back to point (b) of Schein’s definition and consider the origins of 
strategic culture.  
Figure 2: Potential sources of strategic culture14 
For a start, one may generalise that strategic culture is rooted in the relevant 
community’s early, seminal experiences, and that the viability of the culture is 
dependent upon inspiration by its opinion-forming elites and the philosophical and 
cognitive characteristics of the state.15 On the other hand, one may be more specific 
and expand the sources of strategic culture into a full typology, comprised of both 
ideational and material elements, as per the example above. The differences among 
strategic cultures are therefore consistent with the variance in their sources. Societies 
may, for example, share a common geographic area, climate and natural resource 
base (material factors), but very little content from the other elements (ideational 
factors) from which they source their cultures. While the import of most of the listed 
sources should be self-explanatory to the informed reader, the study may benefit 
from an elaboration on some of the origins of strategic culture at this time. 
Technology is the first of these. 
Some authors argue that armed forces bring about military change primarily 
by their constant search for a combat advantage and their consequent adoption of 
new technologies and ways of conducting warfare. Others dispute this determinist 
view of technology, and contend that societies and organisations differ substantially 
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in their ability to exploit new technologies, create new operational concepts and 
reorganise their armed forces to take full advantage of the opportunities that 
technology offers.16 As a source of inspiration for a strategic culture, one can 
therefore only appreciate the influence of technology within the context of that 
particular military’s historical experience, its defence organisation, and its preferred 
style of warfare – the totality of its strategic culture, in other words. For example, 
armed forces that idealise conventional war and manoeuvre warfare17 (as the SADF 
had been doing by the late 1980s)18 would assess the value of technology differently 
from those espousing revolutionary war or guerrilla warfare (as the MK had been 
doing all along).19 To the former, increased technological sophistication would have 
allowed for a reduction in force levels, while to the latter it may not have meant 
much in terms of improved military effectiveness. In fact, to MK it may have 
entailed an unacceptable reduction of the revolutionary forces’ footprint among the 
population in the operational area. Whether defence forces are therefore able to 
manage and manipulate technology to their advantage depends on a combination of 
organisational attributes, which yet another source of strategic culture seems to be 
affecting of late, namely generational change. 
Strategic culture changes over time as the security community develops new 
understandings, translates them culturally, and programmes the result into 
behaviour.20 With the arrival of (especially) information technology in the late 20th 
century, for example, individuals and groups are finding themselves empowered – 
and their identities shaped – in ways that were unthinkable before.21 These changes 
to societal culture, which the ubiquitous presence of information technology has 
accelerated, are bound to affect every military eventually. Indeed, generational 
change is believed to be the most consistent (albeit not the most rapid) driver of 
cultural transformation, and is only rarely interrupted by other conditions that may 
cause more rapid changes in strategic culture.22 Taking the SANDF as an example, 
one has to consider that it had not been involved in major combat since its 
establishment. Circumstances conducive to brisk, collective culture change have 
therefore not arisen in this case, and one would imagine that the strategic cultures of 
the defence force’s primary constituents could have remained largely intact, 
awaiting generational change to transform the SANDF’s organisational culture as a 
whole. From the above, it seems clear that defence forces with different sources of 
inspiration would have distinctly different strategic cultures, and therefore different 
strategic preferences and behaviours as well. Through an analysis of those 
preferences and their expressions in policy statements, it should therefore be 
possible to obtain usable indications of the particular military’s intended force 
development strategy, and hence of its strategic culture as well. While setting out a 
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rationale for this deduction, the article will also begin to contextualise some of the 
theoretical concepts that had been touched upon earlier.  
Military strategy as a product of strategic culture and management model 
As explained in Part 1 of the article, strategy and policy are so intimately 
related that their formation processes can be regarded as virtually identical. Baylis, 
Booth, Garnett and Williams, for example, assert that a policy connotes not only 
what it intends to achieve (strategy’s ends), but also with what occurs during its 
actual implementation (strategy’s means and ways), and that a policy without action 
will have no authority in the society that it is supposed to direct. In practice, one can 
accordingly think of defence policy as a stream of purposeful action over time, 
incorporating not only what the department is known to have done, but also what it 
intends doing, and what it is currently trying to do.23 Defence policy gives birth to 
two concurrent types of military strategy – operational strategy, based upon current 
military capabilities, and force developmental strategy (the focus of this article), 
which addresses future security threats and military tasks with future capabilities.24 
A suitable definition of military strategy should therefore encompass both types, 
which is why strategy is defined in this article as the “relating of ends, means and 
ways to achieve the desired [defence] policy goal”.25 Militaries tend to categorise 
strategy as being declaratory (what government and the armed forces say the 
strategy is), actual (what government and the armed forces are essentially doing, 
which may be different from their declared position), and ideal (what the decision-
makers would prefer to do if they had access to the necessary means).26 Compared 
with Mintzberg’s typology (see Part 1 of this article), a military’s declaratory 
strategy would correlate with an intended strategy, while the actual strategy would 
be equivalent to a deliberate strategy. Both forms of strategy are eminently suited for 
employment within a design school management model, and both are subject to the 
influences of an organisation’s strategic culture. To arrive at a declaratory strategy in 
the first place, military decision-makers would have had to evaluate their strategic 
options, and consciously selected the option that best passed the tests of suitability, 
feasibility and (especially) the culture-constrained test of acceptability. In 
accordance with design school management methodology, the armed forces would 
then implement (not ‘achieve’) their intended strategy, believing that its realisation 
is merely a matter of proper execution. Even if this belief were unfounded (which it 
is, more often than not), a defence force that was responsive to feedback loops 
would still have addressed the disparity between its declared policy position and 
changing reality, and thereby guided its actual strategy towards the realisation of 
outcomes that at least largely resemble those of the organisation’s intended 
strategy.27  
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In Part 1, a potential explanation for the SANDF’s failure in this regard was 
already suggested, when reference was made to the design school approach of 
confining the military strategist to formulation of strategy only. This management 
style precludes the strategist’s active participation in strategy implementation, which 
substantially increases the enterprise risk of realising unintended outcomes. For 
example, misperceptions between strategists and implementers regarding the 
original principles and purpose of the strategy may, in the absence of continuous 
strategic leadership interventions, cause the latter to revert to simplistic, incoherent 
pragmatism. This gives rise to a morbid situation, within which management would 
be prone to confusing expediency with effective governance.28 A second, related 
flaw is that the design school, by definition, disregards the possibility of strategy 
formulation (strategic thinking) continuing in parallel with implementation of 
strategy (strategic action). Adherents of the design school are therefore not amenable 
to the incrementalism that successful strategy formation requires.29 Furthermore, by 
reducing the influences of the external environment to the mere identification of 
opportunities and threats they exacerbate this failing. While design school 
strategists’ interpretations of the external environment (subject to the filters of 
strategic culture as they are) may yet serve as inputs into the formulation of their 
intended strategy, this information is not utilised consistently afterwards as 
important considerations in the strategic management process. Military strategists 
may therefore be inclined to account for functional and societal imperatives during 
strategy formulation only, viewing such imperatives afterward merely as factors 
through which the organisation must navigate, rather than as evolutionary stimuli 
with which defence leadership should interact.30 Such a snapshot approach to the 
external environment also implies that, though the design school’s strategic 
management framework may never become outdated, it could easily go out of 
context and become irrelevant with the passage of time – as had evidently happened 
in the case of the SANDF.31 
It is entirely plausible that the filters of the SANDF’s strategic culture had 
distinguished between those events in the external environment that it deemed 
cardinal, demanding a rapid response, and those it regarded as insignificant and of 
secondary interest. Consequently, the strategic behaviour of the organisation 
followed suit, giving rise to a realised strategy with which the organisation was at 
least psychologically comfortable, regardless of the perceived functional 
effectiveness of defence. What usually happens in cases such as these is that, as the 
intended (declaratory) strategy becomes increasingly out of step with the demands of 
the organisation’s external environment, an emergent strategy largely supersedes it. 
Such an emergent strategy would neither be entirely intentional nor deliberate; it 
would rather be an inferred strategy, based on empirical evidence that the actions or 
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neglect of the organisation had, over time, been converging into identifiable trends 
and predictable outcomes, whether premeditated and desirable or not.32 In terms of 
VSM theory (introduced in Part 1), the proliferation of emergent strategy indicates 
that an organisation had reverted to its native cultural values and purposes–in–use, 
instead of adhering to an intended strategy that the institution had previously created 
and professed to. This form of strategic behaviour is often encouraged by deficient 
internal discussions on the larger purpose of the institution, namely debates that are 
lacking, inadequate or poorly grounded in the daily conduct of the personnel of the 
organisation.33 Given that the attribute of military effectiveness is an essential 
outcome of any reputable defence force’s overarching strategy – and features 
accordingly in the South African Defence Reviews of 1998 and 2014 – effectiveness 
will now be located within the strategic management model that has been developed 
thus far.  
Military effectiveness as an outcome of realised strategy 
In spite of its potential importance for state security, literature on military 
effectiveness does not provide a generally acceptable definition for the concept.34 
Brooks and Stanley describe it as “… the capacity to create military power from a 
state’s basic resources in wealth, technology, population size, and human capital”.35 
This definition accentuates military power as an absolute, but fails to acknowledge 
the relevance of the strategic imperatives discussed previously. On the other hand, 
Millett, Murray and Watman define military effectiveness as “… the process by 
which armed forces convert resources into fighting power”, thereby confining 
military effectiveness to its expression in combat only.36 The latter definition is also 
inadequate, because it focuses exclusively on the method and fails to account for the 
purpose of the particular defence force, relative to the military problem on hand (the 
‘ends’ of strategy).37 In their description of military effectiveness as a resource 
conversion process (not a strategic outcome), both definitions appear to emphasise 
the quantifiable attribute of organisational efficiency rather than that of effectiveness 
– a concern with executing activities correctly, as opposed to performing the correct 
activities. In lieu of an acceptable definition from literature, this article consequently 
reflects on military effectiveness simply as the competency of armed forces to 
produce a desired or intended result, i.e. the ability to execute the mission of defence 
successfully, in reasonable disregard of absolute resource cost. However, one should 
not assume that defence policy and (especially) military force development strategy 
always have operational effectiveness as their only goal. 
Countries invest in the creation and maintenance of armed forces for any 
combination of reasons, including the enhancement of their national identities, the 
legitimacy of government, international status, or leveraging diplomatic advantage.38 
35 
 
Aside from military effectiveness, realised strategy may therefore contain traces of 
all of these strategic ‘ends’ originating from the host society’s culture, its social 
structure, its political and economic institutions, and from international factors such 
as global ‘mental models’ and competition among states.39 Nonetheless, it would 
still be possible to derive the extent of the SANDF’s military’s effectiveness from an 
analysis of its realised strategy by applying only four tests: those of integration, 
quality, skill and responsiveness.40 The test for integration relates to the ‘ends’ of 
strategy, as the assessment seeks a verdict on the degree to which the management 
behaviours of a military are internally consistent and mutually reinforcing. 
Integration assumes a unity of purpose between force development activities 
(premised upon future defence requirements) and the current execution of the roles, 
functions and tasks of the military. By ensuring that actual objectives of defence are 
in alignment with its declared aims, integration reduces wasteful expenditure and 
duplication of effort. The test for quality, on the other hand, is concerned with 
strategic ‘means’. Quality refers to the ability of a military to acquire weaponry and 
equipment that are not only superior in terms of function, relative to that of the 
opposition, but also optimised for the current (and plausible future) operational 
context of defence. Quality associates with the cost-efficiency of means, since it 
guides the organisation’s internal management and procurement processes to acquire 
only that which the military actually needs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Evaluating realised strategy 
Likewise, the attribute of skill refers to the competency of military personnel 
in the execution of their designated tasks. Skill concerns the inculcation of 
proficiency through training, education and appropriate experience. It also refers to 
the ability of the military to assimilate new technology, as well as the attitude, 
morale and motivation of its personnel – in other words, considerations of 
professional expertise and the service orientations of defence’s workforce. As 
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depicted in Figure 3, a military’s overarching level of skill would constrain the 
‘ways’ available to defence when it considers strategic options. 
Unlike an evaluation of the appropriateness of a strategy (discussed in Part 
1), the gauging of military effectiveness does not seek to render an anticipatory 
verdict of intended strategy, which is a mere theoretical construct at the time of its 
judgement. As was explained previously, the strategic environment changes 
continuously; hence, military effectiveness is context-dependent and varies across 
time, place and the type of mission that the particular military has to execute (or 
potentially has to accomplish).41 When the article therefore touches upon the last of 
Brooks and Stanley’s characteristics – that of responsiveness – reference is made to 
the ability of a military to customise its activities in the light of its own 
competencies (organisational imperatives), the operational capabilities of 
adversaries (functional imperatives), and other external constraints. A responsive 
military is “… one that adjusts its operational doctrine and tactics to exploit its 
adversary’s weaknesses and its own strengths” and “… one that adjusts and 
compensates for external constraints, including material, geographic, technological, 
social-structural, political, or cultural limitations in its domestic environment”.42 To 
maintain military effectiveness, a responsive defence leadership will continuously 
scan the political and strategic environment and adjust its policy, strategy, doctrine 
and management processes accordingly. In contrast, “[m]ilitaries without 
responsiveness may lose an accurate sense of their particular strengths and 
weaknesses because of a lack of critical self-evaluation and of rigorous assessment 
of the external environment”43 – precisely those internal debates previously referred 
to. The attribute of organisational responsiveness is therefore much more significant 
than its simplistic application as one of the tests for the effectiveness of realised 
strategy would seem to indicate. It originates within the organisational imperative, 
where the institution’s strategic culture resides, and shapes both the receptiveness of 
defence to environmental influences and the reactions of defence to the same. As 
discussed thus far, responsiveness is implicit in every aspect of dynamic 
organisational behaviour. A military’s reactions to its operating environment are the 
prime stimuli for its organisational learning and crucial for the successful evolution 
of the organisation. Before arriving at a comprehensive hypothesis that could 
explain the SANDF’s organisational entropy and declining military effectiveness, 
though, a speculative validation of the main arguments is put forth, as the authors 
have promised. The following section therefore contains an overview of the 
development of the SANDF’s strategic culture.  
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A dichotomous strategic culture: The SANDF’s primary source of strategic 
stasis 
For the first decade of its existence, government deliberately subjected the 
SANDF to cultural reprogramming: an epic exercise in social engineering, of which 
the full implications are only lately being realised (as a result of the delays implicit 
in all feedback loops). Given the cultural hegemony, administrative monopoly and 
exclusive ownership of material resources of the former South African Defence 
Force (SADF), government initially feared that its culture and methodology would 
remain dominant in the contemporary national defence force. Four years after the 
start of transformation, some of the smaller integrating forces were consequently 
still of the opinion that they were being absorbed by the SADF, rather than being 
equitably integrated into a new defence organisation.44 In its efforts to change and 
consolidate the strategic culture of the military, government therefore generated a 
new political vision for the SANDF: the institution was to be “… broadly 
representative of the country’s people at all rank levels, where all people feel at 
home, a defence force of national unity that is credible and legitimate in the eyes of 
all our people”.45 This novel organisational culture centred on the respect of the 
military for the values of a democratic society and directed national defence – 
 “to ensure that the functioning of the Department of Defence is 
consistent with constitutional principles, democratic values and the law; 
 to ensure that military personnel treat each other and members of the 
public with respect and dignity; 
 to maintain and enhance military professionalism; 
 to build confidence and pride in the SANDF; and 
 to build patriotism, loyalty, unity, discipline, morale and combat 
readiness within the SANDF”.46  
Political leadership was therefore intent upon ‘software’ changes, designed 
to transform the ways by which defence managed its human resources, as well as 
changing its institutional culture and the military ethos.47 Consequently, the SANDF 
had an internal, structural focus, dedicating itself to the deliberate transformation of 
the organisation, and aiming primarily at the legitimation of the national defence 
function rather than ensuring the capability of the military to execute its 
constitutional mandate.48 Since the country had just come out of a conflict that had 
lasted for about three decades, the fact that neither the political vision nor the 
intended transformation objectives listed above (with the exception of the last) 
supported the creation of military effectiveness was possibly of lesser importance at 
the time. However, this does not imply that the professed values of the country’s 
new-found political system would have remained the primary source of strategic 
culture for the SANDF ad infinitum. To illustrate, Francois Vreÿ wrote an article in 
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2006 – roughly a decade after the establishment of the SANDF – that dealt 
extensively with the evolution of a South African strategic culture, albeit at national 
level. In this article, he emphasises some of the changes that accompanied the birth 
of the new dispensation:  
 An innovative, liberal political culture, founded on international norms 
and human rights;  
 A foreign policy enamoured with multilateralism, collective defence, and 
African solidarity; and 
 The subordination of the military instrument to other elements of national 
power, focusing on conflict prevention and state reconstruction.  
At the same time, some of the contradictions between declaratory policy and 
strategic behaviour (which Vreÿ calls “operational practice”) were already becoming 
apparent. 49 These include the acquisition of advanced weaponry for the air force and 
navy, on the military side, but it also refers to South Africa’s apparent willingness to 
intervene (virtually) unilaterally in the affairs of Lesotho (1998) and Burundi (2002). 
Of greater concern, though, was the apparent lack of political will to pronounce on 
human rights violations elsewhere in Africa. In fact, some analysts were of the 
opinion that the apparent dichotomy was the result of South Africa having to 
contend with two competing political cultures simultaneously – the professed culture 
of a progressive democracy on the one hand, and the actual values of a revolutionary 
liberation movement on the other.50 While a dichotomous political culture is worthy 
of an investigation all of its own, the current study was predominantly interested in 
the effects of a divided strategic culture on military strategy formation of the 
SANDF. To tell that story, one would have to direct the analysis one level down, to 
statements of defence policy intent and what those statements implied for realised 
strategy.  
There were early indications that, with the passage of time and the deliberate 
implementation of force development strategies, the transformation focus of the 
SANDF was shifting away from its declared aim. Whereas the original goal was to 
effect appropriate changes to defence policy, military ethos and organisational 
structure, the parliamentary committees and the new command cadre of the military 
were increasingly preoccupied with simplistic racial representation – a strategic 
intent for which the Deputy Minister of Defence was not about to apologise any time 
soon,51 and which promptly made ‘transformation’ synonymous with racial 
representativeness.52 While this bias would have been unsurprising, given South 
Africa’s political proclivities in the past, the country’s overt pursuance of racial 
representativeness by politician and defence leadership alike was bound to affect, 
perhaps inadvertently, the strategic culture of the SANDF significantly. Upon the 
establishment of the SANDF in 1994, the armed forces were overwhelmingly 
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comprised of white personnel from the now-defunct SADF: a reasonably 
homogenous social group, with a distinct historical experience, a characteristic set of 
myths and symbols, and defining texts – in other words, unique sources of the 
SADF’s strategic culture. This context was due for brisk, deliberate change 
thereafter. Despite the fact that “… the former SADF has clearly been in the driving 
seat”, the racial composition of the defence force had already changed to 29% black 
officers and 70% black ‘other ranks’ by 1998.53 By 2011, the percentage 
representation (including civilian personnel) stood at 70,6% black, 12,6% coloured, 
1,1% Asian, and 15,7% white,54 changing to 71,8%, 12,7%, 1,1% and 14,2% 
respectively two years later.55 Considering that the current study was especially 
interested in those levels where military strategy is formulated, the racial 
composition of the Department of Defence’s (DOD’s) strategists and corps of 
professionals (the latter included for the sake of completeness) had changed 
likewise, with the black group, in particular, very strongly represented in top 
management by then. Figure 4 substantiates these demographic trends. 
Figure 4: Demographic representation in the DOD by 201156 
By this time, defence had already explained the over-representation of white 
personnel in senior management as a consequence of “historical reasons”, and that 
white officers either had to resign or retire to release posts for blacks at this 
occupational level.57 Clearly, a sweeping change in the SANDF’s demography since 
its founding would have been accompanied by a major alteration in the social 
sources of its organisational culture as well, especially in a South Africa where 
communal cultures were perceived (and forced to evolve) along racial lines for 
almost half a century before democratisation. For two reasons, though, this claim 
does not automatically imply that the traditional black (predominantly African) 
social culture has entirely superseded the archetypal white (predominantly Western) 
culture of the SANDF since then. The first argument is based upon simple 
arithmetic, where the table above provides evidence that there are still many senior 
Occupational 
Band 
Black Coloured Asian White 
Total 
(100%) 
Top Management 
29  
(85,3%) 
0  
(0 %) 
1  
(2,9%) 
4  
(11,8%) 
34 
Senior 
Management 
199  
(54,2%) 
16  
(4,3%) 
22  
(6%) 
130 
(35,4%) 
367 
Professionally 
Qualified 
4 183  
(43%) 
1 109  
(11,4%) 
270 
(2,8%) 
4 158 
(42,8%) 
9 720 
Total 4 411 1 125 293 4 292 10 121 
40 
 
white officers remaining in – especially – senior management posts in the SANDF. 
In these positions, one can expect them still to have a substantial, albeit ever-
diminishing, influence upon strategic planning. However, Figure 4 reveals that the 
same argument does not apply to the vital activity of strategic visioning, which is a 
function of top management and where the African culture is dominant. Secondly, 
the armed forces as a whole would have been subject to generational change in all of 
its constituent cultures, Western and African, over time. The cultures of South 
African society would have been changing qualitatively since 1994, and those of 
defence’s constituent race groups would have paralleled the gradual convergence of 
the nation at large. Nevertheless, the differences between the two prevalent social 
cultures would have been much more visible during the first years of the SANDF’s 
existence. The values and norms of these two original cultures were bound to have 
been in a tacit, imperceptible, intuitive competition with each other from the very 
beginning, and the constant tension between the dominant social cultures would 
have been enough to create vacillation and ambiguity in the formation of strategy. 
Given that defence sources its strategic culture from social culture as well, and that 
strategic culture guides both the institution’s perceptions of strategic reality and the 
direction of its strategic behaviour, this article could plausibly attribute at least part 
of the SANDF’s current stasis to this conflicted organisational culture. The 
prognosis for military effectiveness becomes worse when one considers yet another 
source of the SANDF’s strategic culture(s): that of former military force affiliations, 
each with its particular historical experiences, organisational structures, myths and 
symbols.  
The co-existence of a number of strategic cultures within a defence force is 
normal if the divisions run along vertical or functional lines (as with the ethos 
differences among the services, for example).58 In the case of the SANDF, however, 
this article argues that the cultural rifts tended to stretch horizontally within the 
strategy-making bodies of the organisation right from the start. Assuming the early 
dominance of the former SADF, one would expect to find evidence of its military-
strategic preferences in defence policy publications of that time – and so it is, 
indeed. Three policy prescripts, in particular, provide clues to the conventional 
cultural bias of the SANDF’s strategists in 1996. First, there is the injunction that the 
force levels, armaments and expenditure of the military shall be determined by 
defence policy, as derived from (among others) an analysis of the external and 
internal security environment.59 This statement, logical and pragmatic as it appears 
to be in theory, indicates compliance with the dynamic school’s approach to 
strategic management, encourages reasoned flexibility, and gives credence to 
feedback from the external environment. In practice, though, the extraordinary delay 
in producing a revised defence review – a symptom of the SANDF’s increasing 
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entropy – trivialises the original policy statement and negates the formation of an 
appropriate military strategy. Moreover, the original defence policy envisaged that 
the “SANDF shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced 
military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently”.60 Apart 
from the fact that the latter proclamation contains adjectives – “balanced”, 
“affordable” and “technologically advanced”, for example – that would be difficult 
to reconcile in a real world with limited resources, it also contradicts the pragmatism 
of the previous statement. Its directive tone is indicative of a technocratic paradigm, 
supportive of traditional military dogma, and leaving little room for innovative 
adaptations to environmental realities. From the evidence available (some of which 
the article referred to in the introduction), this intended strategic outcome, too, failed 
to realise. Likewise, the third statement dispels any further doubt regarding the 
strategists’ preconceptions, by saying that the primary role of the SANDF “shall be 
to defend South Africa against external military aggression” – a contingency that the 
defence fraternity has never faced since the establishment of the Union Defence 
Force in 1912, and which is still highly implausible one hundred years later.61 In 
combination with other pronouncements in the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 
Defence Review, these three policy prescripts point to the superior weight of 
functional imperatives in the formulation of policy and declaratory military strategy. 
The questions now begging answers are therefore:  
 Why were these prescripts, so indicative of the expired SADF’s 
conventional warfare paradigm, given such prominence in defence policy; 
and  
 Why were the prescripts not adhered to during implementation of 
strategy?  
Whereas a follow-on study should attempt to supply comprehensive answers 
to these questions, the current study only attempted to provide some avenues for 
investigation.  
The first hint regarding the reasons for the prominence of the functional 
imperative in defence policy arises from what Rocky Williams calls “the strong 
ascriptive affinities that exist between many armed forces of the developing world 
and the intellectual discourses of the former [Western] colonisers”.62 Had these 
affinities dominated the SANDF’s strategic thinking, though, defence would 
probably have adopted the transformation pathway of emulation, and modelled itself 
exclusively upon the types of equipment, operational concepts and techniques used 
by other, idealised defence organisations.63 Instead, the notion that the bulk of the 
tactics, techniques and practices of the former non-statutory forces – and especially 
those at the operational level of warfare – would not have been fitting in a modern 
defence force, and especially not in the force design template of the SADF of yore, 
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seems to have held sway. As was intimated previously, the continuation of the 
former SADF’s military practices was also encouraged by the fact that, at the time 
when defence introduced its new policy, the SADF’s command structure was still 
very much in charge and was using its pre-existing infrastructure, instructors and 
training institutions to conduct the SANDF’s force development. Turning to the 
glaring absence of defence policy prescripts in realised strategy, one could argue that 
the intended conversion of (especially) the former revolutionary forces to the new 
military paradigm that the policy prescribed was merely a pragmatic, tactful, face-
saving illusion – at least, insofar as the former SADF’s ideological competitors were 
concerned. In this case, much of defence policy’s drive towards military 
effectiveness would boil down to mere utilitarian constructs, which stakeholders 
superficially maintained to enhance all of the integrating forces’ self-worth, to avoid 
defensive responses, to encourage the relationship-building process, and ultimately 
to ensure the successful melding of the former forces into one unified institution.64 
In situations such as these, existing cultural rules regarding interaction and 
communication dictate that the actors will readily sacrifice collaboration and 
understanding to preserve their respective reputations.65 However, these charades 
would also have had other deleterious consequences, in that they would have 
suppressed the type of honest and exhaustive debates that stand central to learning 
organisations. In this manner, the SANDF’s adoption of a novel, shared strategic 
culture had been obstructed in the past, and may still be delayed in the present.  
One finds evidence in support of this theory in the fledgling SANDF of the 
late 1990s, where each of the integrating forces were ostensibly treated as if they 
were all at the same level of military professionalism, had equally viable military 
doctrines, and had been equally successful in achieving their military objectives.66 
This was especially true in the case of the relationship between the SADF and MK – 
the predecessor regime’s defence force and the ruling party’s military force, 
respectively – when the Chief of the SADF and the Chief of Staff MK served as co-
chairs of the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council.67 In spite of the patent disparities 
between the SADF and the other integrating militaries, this power balancing was a 
necessary machination, given that the revolutionary forces had clearly won the 
political struggle and were now in power despite the SADF remaining undefeated in 
combat. Given the adage that it often takes a beating for an armed force to adjust 
substantively to the actual conditions of war,68 one may well ask which of the two 
primary antagonists (the SADF or MK) perceived themselves to have been either the 
vanquished or the victors, and therefore obliged to adopt a more functional military 
theory. Colin Gray is of the opinion that, in strategy, nothing fails like success, 
because the victor becomes unjustifiably persuaded of his or her genius or of the 
favour of the gods.69 The article therefore argues that the lack of closure on issues of 
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an appropriate political culture, a suitable social culture, and an effective military 
culture contrived to maintain the viability of two discrete, concurrent, horizontally 
stratified strategic cultural paradigms in the SANDF: that of the defunct SADF 
(initially dominant) and that of the obsolete MK (currently governing).70 The uneasy 
co-existence of these two paradigms, each with its own worldview and value system, 
but within the same organisational imperative, would have confounded the 
SANDF’s efforts to form an appropriate strategy indefinitely. Moreover, the 
SANDF’s preferred strategic management model may have contributed further to 
the stasis that, after almost two decades of transformation, is becoming more 
apparent in defence’s realised strategy by the day.71 To validate this assertion, the 
article will again, as in Part 1, resort to Henry Mintzberg’s criticism of the design 
school management approach. 
Strategy formation by design: The SANDF’s primary method towards strategic 
stasis 
Mintzberg is of the opinion that strategists of the design school – whose 
generic approach the SANDF is presumed to have been using – are liable to detach 
thinking from acting, to encourage managers to remain aloof from the ground-level 
activities of the business, to oversimplify strategy, and to deny its formation as being 
a long, subtle and difficult process of organisational learning.72 Nonetheless, 
Mintzberg also recognises that the design school’s method of strategy formation 
may be more viable in certain situations. The first condition for success is that, in 
principle, one mind should be able to deal with all of the information relevant to the 
formation of strategy. The organisation’s functional context should therefore be 
relatively simple, allowing for an unambiguous definition of the strategic problem – 
a setting which the transformation of the SANDF, in all of its complexity, certainly 
did not provide. A second, related stipulation is that strategists at the top should have 
sufficient access to and experience of the competencies of the institution and its 
operating environment. To buttress their potential monopolisation of strategy 
formulation, strategists should thus be insiders, and have constructed a deep, 
intimate knowledge of both the organisation and the intricacies of its current 
circumstance over a substantial period.73 Again, a study of SANDF internal 
communication bulletins reveals that this condition, too, did not apply to the 
organisation during the early years of its transition. In fact, the situation was 
“extremely complex”.74  As early as 1998, the Deputy Minister of Defence admitted,  
[t]he problems or [sic] merging into a new SANDF, and of 
transforming the inherited institution, have proven to be a 
monumental challenge. This is exemplified by the perception or 
perhaps fear of former TBVC [Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda 
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and Ciskei] and NSF [non-statutory forces] members that they are 
being absorbed by the old SADF rather than experiencing an even-
handed integration of all members – the SADF included – into a new 
force.75  
Considering the interest of this article in military effectiveness, the SANDF 
even then (1998) suffered from a dubious (operational) role definition, institutional 
overstretch, and a severe case of transformation fatigue: arguably, symptoms of 
unsuitable strategic ends, inadequate strategic means, and inappropriate strategic 
ways.76 In considering what the article has addressed before, one therefore 
immediately appreciates the SANDF’s long-term strategic management challenge: 
the environmental context of the SANDF would not have conformed to the caveats 
for prescriptive strategy formation in the youthful days of the institution, and the 
SANDF would have had to be exceptionally competent at organisational learning to 
have become compliant since then.  
A third condition for the successful application of a design strategy method 
is that the strategist should have validated the stability of Mintzberg’s first two 
criteria (mentioned above), before implementing intended strategy of the 
organisation. Within this relatively stable context, planners should have a clear 
understanding of current functional, societal and organisational imperatives, and be 
able to predict with confidence the future changes that will come about in these 
domains – all of this, to ensure that the organisation’s intended strategies remain 
relevant well beyond their implementation date.77 This condition is necessary 
because strategists of the design school are, by definition, ideologically constrained, 
less responsive to the influences of (especially) the external environment, and 
therefore less amenable to the exploitation of emergent events. However, it would 
hardly have been plausible for the SANDF to know the future when it compiled the 
1998 Defence Review, while it was already acquiring a suite of heavy combat 
systems for the SA Air Force and the SA Navy – this, for a country that had always 
been oriented towards a landward threat.78 Moreover, in its first decade of existence 
one could scarcely have considered the SANDF as being in a state of stable 
equilibrium. Within the short space of a few years, the external and internal 
environments of the Department of Defence were changing radically with alterations 
in social and political paradigms, adjustments to policy, and major amendments to 
defence structures.79 Yet, even in this volatile environment, politicians were 
informing the citizenry and its armed forces that, in typical design school style,  
[t]ransformation and change represents a territory which can only be 
successfully traversed when everyone is clear about our goals, puts 
shoulder to the wheel, and strives as part of a united winning team in 
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a spirit of co-operation and trust. Sound policy, implemented 
throughout a willing institution, by means of effective structures and 
attitudes, will ensure the success of transformation. Transformation 
is on track and we will achieve our objectives.80 
The SANDF, too, was apparently convinced that the realisation of its 
intended transformation strategy was purely dependent upon the formulation of 
unambiguous ends and the application of a highly elaborated, systematic, 
prescriptive method to achieve the same.81 This approach, espoused by politicians 
and military professionals alike, implied that the strategists’ individual learning 
would have ended, and their intended strategy fully explicated, before 
implementation could have commenced. In this manner, the SANDF seems to have 
negated the benefits of organisational responsiveness to its external environment, 
and vaccinated itself against organisational learning as well – both effects being 
unintended and incidental consequences of adopting an inappropriate strategic 
management model. Nonetheless, the poor prognosis for the SANDF’s 
transformation strategy becomes worse when one considers the last of Mintzberg’s 
criteria for the successful employment of the design school philosophy: that the 
organisation should be willing and prepared to cope with a centrally articulated 
strategy right from the start. Influential members of the organisation should not only 
be ready to defer to the principal strategists, but should also have the time, energy, 
resources and emotional commitment to implement the declared strategy.82 The 
SANDF has been aware of this proviso all along, as evidenced by its early 
comments on transformation management.  
International studies reveal that not many large institutions or 
organisations are very successful at profound transformation, despite 
their good intentions. Why is this? Is a large and complex 
organisation such as ours doomed to a similar fate? It is submitted 
that such failures mainly lie in the area of change management. In 
most cases, the more technical aspects – designing and implementing 
new and sound processes, structures and systems – are well executed 
by competent people. The lack of success seems to be as a result of 
the failure by the organisation’s executives to enlist employee 
support. Studies seem to point to the requirement for an 
understandable change message to employees, in particular as seen 
from their point of view. Employees’ concerns have to be addressed. 
Executives, and not lower level managers, should help people to 
visualise their contributions to change. This needs to be addressed 
throughout the implementation and continuously reaffirmed. 
Executives are to be seen as leading and showing the way.83 
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The article has already confirmed that the SANDF’s initial transformation 
had occurred within a bipolar cultural context. This environment allowed for the 
formulation of a declaratory statement of defence policy, largely based on the values 
and norms of the defunct SADF, but at odds with the subsequent formation of an 
pragmatic, deliberate military strategy. Whereas defence policy and the structures of 
the SANDF – still overwhelmingly staffed by former SADF members – were mainly 
intent upon achieving military effectiveness and cost-efficiency, political leadership 
(presumably speaking on behalf of personnel from the other integrating forces) had 
fundamental emotive and socio-economic goals in mind.84 Thus, for the members of 
the former SADF, a transformed defence function possibly meant that the “SANDF 
shall be a balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced military force, 
capable of executing its tasks effectively and efficiently”, as promised by defence 
policy.85 For the other constituents, though, transformation could primarily have 
denoted a defence organisation that was representative of South Africa’s racial 
demography, that treated its members fairly, attended to their conditions of service 
and physiological needs, paid them regularly, and raised their social status “… to the 
levels s/he deserves …”.86 Having had their basic needs satisfied all along, the 
former SADF complement fixated upon functional imperatives, while (especially) 
the former non-statutory forces were preoccupied with societal and organisational 
imperatives. Presented with these substantial differences in the expectations and 
institutional/occupational orientations of the two dominant cultures in the SANDF, it 
would have been extremely difficult for the organisation to create those salutary 
conditions for strategy by design that Mintzberg describes. It would also have been 
virtually impossible to establish de facto consensus on the integration of the ends of 
the transformation strategy, agreement on the quality of equipment needed, and 
acceptance of the actual skills sets required for the SANDF – all of which military 
effectiveness theory demands.  
From the elaboration above, it seems clear that the design school method 
was not suitable for employment within the first decade of the establishment of the 
SANDF. However, this does not mean that the particular approach to strategic 
management may not have become more viable since then. After all, the constraints 
of the SANDF’s strategic context have been changing continuously for about two 
decades now, providing the organisation with sufficient opportunity to respond 
appropriately. For example, Mintzberg is of the opinion that the design school’s 
model is eminently suitable for an organisation that is entering a period of re-
conceptualisation, providing that its functional context displays the following 
characteristics. Firstly, the environment that previously supported and maintained 
the former strategy of the organisation has changed drastically, so that the strategic 
plans of the organisation are no longer viable; and secondly, the organisation has 
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already entered a period of relative stability, which will support a new conception of 
its strategy.87 
The design school model, therefore, seems most applicable to an 
organisation that has just come out of a period of flux (the SANDF’s 
“transformation”) and into one of operating stability. While a major realignment of 
strategy usually occurs as a response to a crisis or challenge in the external 
environment (such as the SANDF’s “Battle of Bangui”), an organisation may also 
embark upon reformation proactively, for instance when key uncertainties are 
resolved, or when a maximum period has elapsed since the last strategy review. This 
article contends that such periods had occurred in the SANDF’s recent history. The 
SA Army, for instance, agrees that its initial generalist strategic focus on the 
integration of the former forces (and its accompanying inculcation of a human rights 
culture) had officially petered out prior to 2006 already. Consequently, the army 
then re-focused its force development strategy towards the achievement of military 
effectiveness, by introducing the first iteration of what was to become its “future 
strategy” at that time.88 This period also coincided with other signs that the SANDF 
was ready for an evolutionary adjustment, as evidenced by the DOD’s abortive 
efforts to adjust the 1998 Defence Review since then (e.g. Defence Update 2005).89 
However, the mere fact that the SANDF was still purported to be relatively 
ineffective by 2013, and that the new Defence Review still had to pass muster in 
parliament by the end of 2014, implies that something other than the SANDF’s 
strategic management model may be impeding the organisation’s responsiveness. It 
is possible that the first, interim stage of the defence force’s declaratory 
transformation strategy – with its focus on racial and former force representation, 
workplace liberalisation and cultural reform – may have evolved into its ultimate, 
realised strategy by default. Mintzberg supports the view that the clear enunciation 
of strategy, coupled with a machine bureaucracy’s habitual planning and control 
processes, would have made an organisation like the SANDF more resistant to 
change than would have been the case if a dynamic strategy-forming method had 
been followed.90 While one may therefore no longer blame defence’s strategic 
management model for its current ineffectiveness, the consequences of its adoption 
at the start of the SANDF’s first transformation still continue to bedevil initiatives 
towards the second.  
Conclusion 
This study maintained that militaries in general (and therefore probably the 
SANDF in particular) lean towards the design school’s approach to strategy 
formation. When considering their options, defence strategists weigh influences 
from two external contexts (the functional and societal imperatives) and one internal 
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environment (the organisational imperative). Whereas emphasis on the functional 
imperative will shift a defence force’s strategic focus towards military effectiveness, 
an accentuation of the societal imperative will encourage a concern with the 
structure, service conditions and management efficiency of a particular military. The 
organisational imperative, in turn, serves to mediate strategic influences from both 
the external and the internal environments, and then shapes the armed forces’ 
strategic behaviour accordingly.  
During the compilation of a hypothetical strategic management model, the 
current study identified three feedback loops that allow an organisation to perceive 
its environment, interpret its implications for strategy formation, decide on an 
appropriate response, and then act accordingly. While insight into the first two loops 
certainly contributes to the argumentation of the study, it is an analysis of the third 
feedback loop that sheds most light on the research problem. When productively 
utilised, this loop serves as an evolution mechanism that stimulates appropriate 
responses to the external environment, facilitates organisational learning, minimises 
entropy, and assists the institution in remaining functionally effective. However, 
strategists of the design school generally underestimate the impact of the functional 
and societal imperatives, have less appreciation for the potential effects of changes 
in the organisation’s operational context, and are disinclined to manipulate emergent 
strategy; ergo, they are less responsive in forming the institution’s realised strategy. 
Two intrinsic qualities of all feedback loops further exacerbate the ensuing risk of 
organisational obsolescence: the delay between cause and effect, and the fact that all 
strategic actions have both intended and unintended outcomes.  
A cursory interrogation of the South African military’s sources of strategic 
culture revealed that the armed forces have had to adjust to the demands of a single 
(novel and possibly dichotomous) political culture since the SANDF’s inception in 
1994. At the same time, the military has had to contend with primarily two 
(distinctive and probably irreconcilable) military cultures: the conventional, mobile 
warfare mentality of the defunct SADF, and the revolutionary, people’s war 
paradigm of the obsolete MK. Accordingly, government consistently touted the 
societal imperative as the highest value in force development, while defence policy 
took its prime directives from the functional imperative instead (albeit only for the 
second stage of the implementation of strategy, after the SANDF had achieved the 
integration of its constituent military forces). In terms of the design school 
paradigm, defence strategists would have assumed the first, evolutionary stage of 
transformation as an interim or transient condition and of passing importance in the 
greater scheme of the implementation of strategy – and thereby underestimated this 
stage’s detrimental impact upon organisational culture, and upon the SANDF’s 
subsequent strategic behaviour. Given that, with the passing of time, MK’s strategic 
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culture was gaining ascendancy as that of the SADF waned, the value preferences of 
the defence force generals eventually shifted closer to those that government had 
espoused all along.  
The ambitions of defence policy towards military effectiveness, through its 
declared combination of ends and means, consequently became less acceptable – or 
at least less pressing – as the armed forces’ strategic culture changed. While major 
portions of the SANDF’s declaratory force development strategy remained 
unrealised, the organisation’s actual transformation strategy maintained most of its 
momentum, even after the period 2004–2006 when an opportunity arose to enhance 
military effectiveness again. It seems that, subsequent to achieving its initial, 
political transformation goals with defence, government has run out of ideological 
steam when confronted with the realities of an ever-changing security environment. 
As usually happens, the realised strategy of the SANDF is therefore comprised of a 
combination of intended strategy (in this case, mainly the societal elements of it) and 
emergent strategy (most of it unintended and unconstructive, in this instance). From 
this evidence, the marriage between the SANDF’s preferred strategic management 
model and its acquired strategic cultures has proved to be an unhappy one. This 
provides a partial explanation for government’s apparent bemusement at adopting an 
intended force development strategy in 1998, achieving its societal component by 
about 2005, realising undesirable strategic outcomes by 2013, and now finding its 
defence force in a state of virtual strategic paralysis. Through the combined 
consequences of a singular political concern with societal imperatives, of a 
sympathetic organisational culture change over time, of leaving the dogma of 
‘transformation’ unchallenged, and of adopting the habitual planning and control 
processes of a machine bureaucracy, defence may now be actively resisting change 
towards military effectiveness rather than promoting it. Whether the Minister of 
Defence and Military Veterans will therefore be able to turn her statements of 
political intent into declaratory strategy (arising from Defence Review 2014) any 
time soon, is a matter of conjecture. It is even more doubtful whether the SANDF, 
given the dysfunctional character of the interplay between its strategic management 
model and strategic cultures, has the capacity to convert its strategic intent into 
realised strategy. With this hypothesis now in the public domain, the article has 
opened the door to a full-blown validation study. 
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